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Recently, the Universitas publisher has released a Polish translation of 
a book edited by a British theoretician and practitioner of photography 
Scott Walden entitled Photography and Philosophy. Essays on the Pencil of 
Nature. The post-conference collection consists of thirteen interesting ar-
ticles on the subject of photography and constitutes a part of an extreme-
ly rich collection of studies and analyses of issues of broadly defined 
aesthetics of the visual arts and the philosophy of art1.
A major advantage of this collection, first of all, is the fact that it 
encompasses texts which present the topic of photography in different, 
sometimes very distant contexts. For instance, Aaron Meskin and Jona-
than Cohen write of photography as evidence material. The concept of 
the truth and fiction in photography, repeatedly evoked by classicists, 
reappears2 (the article by Scott Walden, Kendall L. Walton, Roger Scru-
ton), whilst the topic regarding the composition and spatial relations 
 * The project was financed by the National Science Centre for the doctoral schol-
arship upon the decision no. DEC–2016/20/T/HS1/00470.
 1 Amidst all fields of artistic activity, the works of art, studies and articles which 
are concerned with photography make up the most abundant group. Among the 
authors who wrote about photography we will find: Susan Sontag, Roland Barthes, 
Vilem Fluser, Siegfried Kracauer, Bernd Stiegler or Jean Baudrillard.
 2 The problem of truth in photography, on the other hand, was addressed, for 
instance, by André Rouillé. In the course of his deliberations the researcher concludes 
that only a photograph with specified features may convey the truth. The determi-
nants of truth in photography are focus, flash, expression and transparency. Hence, 
the carrier of truth is documentary photography. Rouillé thereby rejects artistic pho-
tographs characterised by a blur and a significant interference of an artist-photog-
rapher. Cf. A. Rouillé, La Photographie: Entre document et art contemporain. Paris: Gal-
limard 2005.
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in photography is handled by Patrick Maynard. Dominic Lopes, on the 
other hand, presents his reflections on the problem of an appropriate as-
sessment of a work of art. The authors of the said collection also address 
the issue of perception and the problem connected with the mechanicity 
of photographers’ work (Kendall L. Walton). However, the multiplicity 
of depictions and the presentation of interesting and diversified ways of 
interpretation does not break the collection up into separate, unrelated 
parts as the second advantage of the book is that the authors of particular 
articles engage in a dispute with one another. Often, one article consti-
tutes a polemic or response to the theses proposed in another text. Par-
ticular authors involve in a written discussion, refer to the content of the 
texts included in the collection and seek to persuade other researchers to 
accept their arguments. Because of this, the collection is characterised by 
a highly dynamic narration; it is coherent, with the articles complement-
ing one another. An example of a such an exchange of views is Kendall 
L. Walton’s Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism 
and the article by Cynthia Freeland Photographs and Icons. 
Walton puts forward a very controversial thesis in his article. Name-
ly, he claims that photography is nothing else but the result of a me-
chanical process whose course cannot be influenced by anyone, not even 
the photographer. Walton states the following:
Some objections focus on the idea that photographs owe their special 
status to their “mechanical,” “automatic” origins, whereas paintings are 
“handmade.” What is crucial is supposed to be the involvement of a per-
son in the process. Several writers have managed to imply that people 
don’t make photographs.18 In any case the remarkable realism of photo-
graphs is considered to derive not from what they look like but from how 
they come about. On this point I agree3.
According to Walton, there is no such thing as the photographer’s 
intention or idea. What contributes to the creation of an image consists 
solely in the optical-chemical or optical-mechanical process. In the re-
searcher’s opinion, mechanicity is the main feature of photography, 
whereas another one is transparency which consists in the fact that we 
may look at a photograph in the same way as we see the things that 
lie on the other side of the window. The said transparent character of 
a photograph allows establishing a contact with what is in it. Walton 
gives the example concerning the figure of Beethoven: if we were to dis-
cover a photograph of him, we would literally see the great composer. 
The transparency that enables realism is what paintings are deprived of. 
 3 S. Walden, Photography and Philosophy: Essays on the Pencil of Nature. Wiley-
Blackwell 2008, p. 33.
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According to the author the feature of transparency confers a particular 
cognitive value upon photography thanks to which it is particularly use-
ful as evidence material. He writes: “Photographs of a crime are more 
likely to be admitted as evidence in court than paintings or drawings 
are”4. This issue is addressed by Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Cohen. In-
terestingly, however, in their article Photographs as Evidence they criticise 
Walton’s transparency thesis. According to the authors, during the per-
ception of the world, the man obtains information about the visual prop-
erties of things (V-information) and information about spatial locations 
of those things in relation to the body of the viewer (E-information). Pho-
tography is a rich source of the so-called V-information, whereas it will 
never provide E-information. A complete seeing through a photograph, 
and thus, the complete realism will therefore never be possible. 
However, in my opinion, while writing of realism and authenticity of 
photography Walton does not address a very important issue regarding 
the interpretation of photography. Roland Barthes n his dissertation La 
Chambre claire, Note sur la photographie relates to early considerations of 
Jean Paul Sartre and concludes that photography disguises two aspects: 
the real world, i.e. the photograph we look at and the imaginary world, 
i.e. our interpretation of that photograph5, whilst François Soulages in 
his book Esthétique de la photographie notes that without a context a photo-
graph means nothing. We may provide a photograph with any context, 
hence also with any interpretation. However, the choice of a particular 
context is synonymous with the loss of all the other ones. In his delib-
erations, Soulages reaches the conclusion that photography boils down 
to the aesthetics of choice, i.e. the provision of a suitable context, inter-
pretation, and aesthetics of possibilities, i.e. the possibility to introduce 
modifications in a given photograph, perform prints, magnify it, cut out 
 4 Ibidem, p. 14.
 5 In his early phenomenological texts Jean-Paul Sartre mainly dealt with the 
concept of reflective and non-reflective consciousness and the possible acts of non-
reflective consciousness. Sartre distinguished three forms of non-reflective conscious-
ness: perceptual, emotional and imaginary. To explain it very briefly: perceptual 
consciousness registers all the external impressions in our perception, thus it is of 
a passive character. In perceptual consciousness things appear fragmentarily, estab-
lish mutual relations and must be subject to principles of time and space; emotional 
consciousness is understood (after Heidegger and Husserl) as a human way of being 
in the world; imaginary consciousness is simply the opposite of perceptual conscious-
ness. If an act of perception assumes the existence of certain objects, then the act of im-
agination will have the opposite effect, i.e. be based on the assumption that objects do 
not exist. Imaginary consciousness constitutes an object but does not perceive it as it 
is not given in the „form” of perceptual consciousness. An object created as an image 
is absent, non-existent. Therefore, the act of imagining depicts the reality as nothing-
ness. Cf. J.-P. Sartre, L’Imaginaire: Psychologie phénoménologique de l’imagination. Paris: 
Gallimard, p. 1940.
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selected elements from the photograph, etc.6 A similar view is expressed 
by Susan Sontag who in the essay collection On Photography states that 
a photograph means nothing without a context and, moreover, it has 
no effect on the viewer. A photograph acquires its meaning only when 
we interpret it.7 According to Sontag, we tend to keep only these photo-
graphs which mean something to us and which we understand because 
we know their context. A photograph moves us, has an effect on us only 
when we inscribe it in a defined context, for instance, political. Only 
a suitable context, and thereby – interpretation, causes that a photograph 
we look at becomes to us the carrier of truth and authenticity.
The topic of transparency raised by Walton is considered by Cyn-
thia Freeland, however in the context of religious icons. The researcher 
claims that icons serve as manifestations, which enables the establish-
ment of a special contact between the icon and the viewer.
The status of the icon as an image or likeness is unique because of (a) its 
subject matter, (b) the beliefs and attitudes it inspires in viewers, (c) its 
causal origin, and, finally, (d) its reproducibility. First, the icon is a like-
ness in the sense not of resembling but of being a manifestation or ap-
pearance of its prototype. I call this the icon’s «authentic manifestation» 
aspect.8
Freeland wonders whether, due to that fact, photographs also may 
act as manifestations of people and whether such manifestation is pos-
sible thanks to its mechanical character: “Such manifestation has less to 
do with effecting a realistic likeness than with supplying the viewer with 
a sense of contact or presence with the represented subject.9
Other concepts in whose context photography is discussed are verac-
ity and objectivity. These topics are addressed by the collection’s editor 
Scott Walden in the article Truth in Photography and by Barbara Savedoff 
in the text entitled Documentary Authority and the Art of Photography. 
Walden claims that both veracity and objectivity are not the qualities of 
photography itself. Veracity is connected with the thoughts arising from 
viewing an image, whereas objectivity is compared to Walton’s mecha-
nicity and understood as the said optical-mechanical process of render-
ing photographs. While writing about veracity and objectivity, Barbara 
Savedoff introduces the term documentary authority.10 In her article, she 
analyses abstract and surreal photographs, i.e. such that undermine 
 6 F. Soulages, Esthétique de la photographie: la perte et le reste. Paris: Nathan, 1998.
 7 S. Sontag, On Photography. New York: Anchor Book, 1990.
 8 S. Walden, Photography and Philosophy: Essays on the Pencil of Nature. Wiley-
Blackwell, 2008, p. 59.
 9 Ibidem, p. 52.
 10 Ibidem, p. 111.
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our confidence in the documentary character of photographs (a simi-
lar concept may be found in the deliberations of André Rouillé, whom 
I have mentioned above. The more artistic a photograph is: blurred, out 
of focus, inciting our imagination, the more it abandons the realism and 
truth). The author wonders whether the presence of abstraction and sur-
realism may cause the viewers to cease to assume the said authority.
A text in which the reader may find very controversial assump-
tions is the article by Roger Scruton. The main thesis proposed by the 
researcher is as follows: photography cannot represent anything, so the 
only kind of art that may fall under the definition of representational arts 
is painting. Scruton claims that we only deal with representation when 
a certain intentional relation occurs between a painting and its subject. 
A photograph and a photographed object do not stand in an intention-
al but casual relation which indicates that the photograph represents 
something that exists. Therefore, a photograph will not be a representa-
tion of something but merely a record of how an actual object looked at 
a particular time. With this statement Scruton moves on to discussing an 
interesting issue regarding the time of photography. Namely, he states 
that photography differs from the art of portraiture in the fact that it de-
picts its object at one particular moment, a time slice of reality, whereas 
a portraitist attempts to present his objects as continuous in time: “It is 
characteristic of photography that, being understood in terms of a causal 
relation to its subject, it is thought of as revealing something momentary 
about its subject – how the subject looked at a particular moment”.11
As regards the temporariness of photography, similar conclusions 
were drawn by Roland Barthes. According to the French philosopher, 
photography is marked by death as a photograph presents a person, 
situation or an event of the past, and not of the present. A photographer 
immortalises in a photograph one particular moment, a facial expres-
sion or a gaze that in his opinion was worth immortalising, and he does 
so only once and will not be able to repeat it ever again. The only thing 
a photographer may do is mechanically reproduce a given photograph, 
for instance by making its prints. The same issue is addressed by the 
aforementioned François Soulages, who lists two main features of pho-
tography. The first is the infinity which consists in the fact that each pho-
tograph may be infinitely reproduced in the form of prints. This charac-
teristic of photography results from the specificity of the tool we use in 
its realisation, namely the camera. The other property of photography is 
its irreversibility. Our intention is to capture a certain event, for instance, 
our child running in the rain across a meadow. Such exceptional circum-
stances: the place of an event, people participating in it, etc. – all of these 
aspects together happen only once, they will not return and we will 
 11 Ibidem, p. 148.
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not be able to take the same photograph for the second time.12 Soulages 
states that a once exposed film cannot be altered. We may only inter-
fere with the negative. Barthesa further develops these observations and 
notes that when we take a photograph of a particular person by doing 
so we reduce their entire life to a concrete moment, the moment when 
the button on the camera is pressed. To a certain degree the photograph 
snatches a single point in the life of a person that it represents, which is 
not and cannot be the culmination of all other points. We may even state 
that photography creates an artificial image of a person it depicts.
Similarly to the authors I have mentioned earlier, Scruton also refers 
to the concept of transparency of photography. Transparency causes that 
a photograph may replace the object it represents. If a photograph is 
beautiful it means that the photographed object also has to be beautiful 
in reality. A matter related to a painterly work looks different. A paint-
ing may be beautiful even when it represents something which in reality 
may evoke repugnance and be disgusting (a corpse, wound, autopsy). 
The author’s conclusion is as follows: only a representation of something 
may be recognised as a work of art. Photography does not represent but 
indicates something, hence it does not fall within the definition of a work 
of art, unless the process of its creation involved factors which belong to 
the process of photographing (for example, the photographer’s intention 
or concept rejected by Kendall L. Walton), as a photographer does not 
influence the mechanical process of a photograph creation. This radical 
thesis is disputed by David Davies. In the article How Photographs “Sig-
nify”: Cartier-Bresson’s “Reply” to Scuton he refers to Rudolph Arnheim’s 
analyses according to whom the method of presentation of a given object 
(such as the angle or direction of a take) depends on a photographer, 
thus a photograph itself may express the author’s intention. Similar 
claims are voiced by Cartier-Bresson. He notices that a photographer is 
able to capture the relations and the meanings arising from the relations 
between particular events and figures depicted in photographs. Thus, 
Davies believes that photography should not be limited merely to its 
mechanicity. A photographer–artist›s idea and activity as well as the ef-
fect of their efforts, i.e. photographs, are to be recognised as works of art. 
Patrick Maynard expresses a similar opinion. In the article Scales of Space 
and Time in Photography: “Perception Points Two Ways” he describes all 
the factors a photographer needs to consider in order to ensure a good 
take. Thus, the quality of a photograph does not depend on the spatial 
sense of the photographer, his/her perceptiveness, the ability to capture 
the relations among several objects seen by the camera and the ability to 
compose a scene.
 12 F. Soulages, Esthétique de la photographie: la perte et le reste, Paris: Nathan, 1998.
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It is impossible to summarise all the essays of the collection in such 
a short review. Nonetheless, the presented book is highly valuable and 
interesting. The reader will find there texts which present photography 
in different contexts. Each essay of the reviewed collection constitutes 
a thorough and detailed exposition filled with historical references. The 
articles have been written with the use of a fine language and the line 
of reasoning presented by each researcher is clear and comprehensive. 
What deserves praise is a broad historical background provided to in-
troduce the discussed subject matter as well as the provision of numer-
ous examples to illustrate a particular problem. It is worth noting that 
copies of the majority of the photographs discussed are also included 
in the presented collection. An insight into the illustrations facilitate the 
reader’s understanding of an analysed issue. The work is preceded with 
a detailed introduction in which the editor precisely summarises par-
ticular articles and points to the relations existing between them. The 
said introduction constitutes a great hint for the reader whose interests 
lie with a particular topic related to photography. The book and its Pol-
ish translation contain an impressive bibliography and short notes of all 
the authors of the texts included in the collection. The book should be 
recommended to all of those who are interested in the issues of broadly 
defined modern aesthetics and the philosophy of visual arts.
Marta Agata Chojnacka
